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claim a debilitating circumstance will affect their performance or engage in self-sabotaging 
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in actions that hurt performance, I also propose they are less likely to engage in actions that help 
performance. Findings provided limited support for the predictions and imply that handicappers 
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Forgoing Proactive Self-Control: Inactions and Self-Handicapping 
From losing weight, to staying on budget, all individuals have goals they strive to 
achieve. Despite the importance of these goals, individuals often fail to achieve them by 
sacrificing long-term goal attainment for immediate gratification or satiation. These puzzling 
failures have captured the interest of social psychologists for nearly two decades, producing a 
new area of research on self-control that examines the factors that cause such failures and 
exploring interventions to increase the likelihood of successes (e.g. Baumeister & Heatherton, 
1996). 
Self-Control 
 Self-control can be thought of as the various processes through which people prioritize 
distal, as opposed to proximal, goals and motives (Fujita, 2011). For example, when trying to 
achieve a good grade on an exam, an individual will need to study to achieve their long-term 
goal of getting a good grade in the course. To reach this goal, they will have to navigate through 
a sea of potential distractions like Netflix, social media, and roommates. Although these 
distractions provide a proximal rewarding experience, those with successful self-control will be 
able to use one of several strategies in order to prioritize studying and achieve their distal goal of 
getting a good grade.  
While there are many ways to achieve distal goals, the vast majority of research to date 
has focused only on one type of self-control process: reactive self-control. Reactive self-control 
is a process in which individuals inhibit impulses after temptations are encountered (e.g. 
Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989; Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Fujita, 
2008). For example, a dieter would need to restrain their automatic impulse to eat a delicious 
donut when they come across an open box in the breakroom. To successfully prioritize their 
2  
distal goal (e.g. weight loss), an individual must have high levels of motivation and attentional 
resources (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Inzlict & Schmeichel, 2012). Engaging in an 
act of reactive self-control consumes these psychological resources, making future acts more 
difficult (e.g. Baumeister et al., 1998). 
Although this effortful impulse control is undoubtedly an important way to engage in 
self-control, it is just one process through which self-control can be achieved. More recently, 
researchers have examined proactive self-control processes in which individuals can instead 
remove temptations from environments (Fujita & Roberts, 2010; Fujita, 2011; Delose, 
vanDellen, & Hoyle, 2015; vanDellen, Shah, Leander, Delose, & Bornstein, 2015). For example, 
a dieter might avoid going to the breakroom to eat lunch where unhealthy snacks are and instead 
choose to eat outside or at his desk. The types of proactive strategies individuals use vary widely 
from self-imposed punishment on impulsive actions (e.g. Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Fujita & 
Roberts, 2010), precommitment to deadlines (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002), planning ahead for 
specific situations (Gollwitzer, 1993), prioritizing difficult tasks (Delose et al., 2015), and 
surrounding oneself with people who aid goal pursuit (vanDellen et al., 2015).  
By using these proactive processes, individuals can circumvent the need to use reactive 
self-control. Due to the high amount of in-the-moment self-control failure of reactive processes, 
those with good self-control more often use proactive processes (e.g. Trope & Fishbach, 2000; 
Fishbach et al., 2003) and may resort to reactive self-control only when other means have failed 
(Fujita, 2011). 
Strategicness of Proactive Self-Control 
Despite being a more successful means to achieve distal goals, proactive processes are 
utilized strategically. In a recent study, Delose and colleagues (2015) found that good self-
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regulators only engage in proactive exercise strategies when health goals are important, and 
exercising is perceived as difficult. In these situations where participants feared failing at their 
important health goal, good self-regulators were motivated to exercise earlier in the day before 
depleted resources or unexpected challenges got in the way. When participants were 
unconcerned with failure, no proactive self-control was used. Similarly, vanDellen and 
colleagues (2015) found that good self-regulators sought out study partners that would help them 
do well in a statistics course only when they were concerned about failing the course. When 
concern was low, good self-regulators were just as likely to choose a “good” partner as a “bad” 
partner.  
Thus, proactive self-control processes seem to be strategically used only when 
individuals fear a potential self-control failure. When this fear drops, individuals might devote 
their attentional resources elsewhere to ensure that other important goals can be pursued and 
obtained (e.g. Louro, Pieter, Zeelenberg, 2007; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). However, in these 
types of situations where fear of failure is high, a new type of goal might also become active.  
Self-Protection 
One of our most basic motives as individuals is to see ourselves as good, competent, and 
decent people (e.g. Aronson, 1998; Baumeister, 1993). When failure looms, that image of 
ourselves as highly competent is threatened and we move to protect ourselves (Covington, 1984).
 When an individual fears that he or she might fail at an important upcoming task, there 
are many strategies the individual could use to protect his or her self-concept. From engaging in 
massive amounts of preparation (Oleson, Poehlmann, Yost, Lynch, & Arkin, 2000), to defensive 
pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986), to self-affirmation (Steele & Liu, 1983), individuals can 
choose from a host of options in the self-protective toolbox (e.g. Tesser, 2001).  
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One of these options, called self-handicapping, involves creating a preemptory excuse for 
failure so as to shift the blame away from the self and onto an external source (Arkin & 
Baumgardner, 1985). By doing this, the handicapper is able to protect their own and others’ 
beliefs about their competency (Harris & Snyder, 1986). The excuses self-handicappers use vary 
from claims of depilating circumstances such as testing anxiety (Smith, Snyder, & Handelsman, 
1982) to engaging in self-sabotaging behaviors such as alcohol use (Berglas & Jones, 1978) and 
effort withdrawal (Hirt, Deppe, & Gordon, 1991). Despite the benefits of self-protection these 
actions enable, self-handicapping comes at a high cost. Research finds increased failure and 
substance abuse, decreased intrinsic motivation, and negative interpersonal consequences all 
result from chronic use of this strategy (Eyink, Hirt, Crawford, Karpen, & Heltzel, under review; 
Hirt, McCrea, & Boris, 2003; Zuckerman, Kieffer, & Knee, 1988; Zuckermen & Tsai, 2005). 
Because self-handicapping often involves failing to achieve distal goals like good grades, 
some researchers have characterized self-handicapping as a lack of self-control (Baumeister, 
1998; Martin et al., 2003; Ferrari & Emmons, 1995).  Interestingly, in a previous study in our 
lab, we ourselves characterized a handicapping target by saying “He lacks discipline and self-
control and just wanted to see the movie instead of studying” (Hirt et al., 2003). Previous 
researchers have even found strong correlations between trait self-handicapping and trait self-
control (Uysal & Knee, 2012; Gitter, 2008). 
However, I urge readers to take a more nuanced approach and instead consider self-
handicappers as people engaged in multiple goal pursuit. Individuals have multiple goals active 
at any given time, and often must switch their attention and motivation from goal to goal 
depending on situational and personal factors (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). Self-handicappers, 
instead of lacking the self-control necessary to engage in the successful prioritization of distal 
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goals, might similarly be prioritizing a new goal of self-protection over those distal goals. For 
example, a chronic handicapper’s need to protect his sense of self-worth and belief in his own 
math competence might be more important than actually getting a good grade on the math exam. 
Thus, he might choose to handicap by withdrawing effort instead of engaging self-control and 
studying the night before the math test. In the likely case that he does poorly, this would not 
reflect a self-regulatory failure, but instead a prioritization of his self-protection goal. 
Strategicness of Self-Handicapping 
 What could lead individuals to prioritize this type of self-protection? Aspects of the 
situation, such as the gender composition of the audience (Hirt et al., 2003), and features of the 
individual, such as covert self-esteem (Harris, Snyder, Higgins, & Schrag, 1986), can all increase 
the likelihood of self-handicapping. Most importantly though, a self-handicapper must 
experience a high amount of fear of failure, which has been found to be a necessary precursor to 
handicapping (Hirt, McCrea, & Kimble, 2000).  
Researchers often manipulate fear of failure to increase the likelihood of self-
handicapping. One way they do this is through the use of non-contingent success feedback (e.g. 
Jones & Berglas, 1978). In these paradigms, handicappers are told they performed extremely 
well on a task and that this exemplary performance sets high performance expectations for a 
future task. This increases handicappers’ fear of failure, and thus increases one’s likelihood to 
self-handicap. Similarly, an ongoing line of work examines how control beliefs affect fear of 
failure and subsequent handicapping behaviors (Eyink & Hirt, in progress). We hypothesize that 
when an individual believes nothing he does will affect the outcome of a performance, he is 
likely to feel high fear of failure, and subsequently might turn to self-handicapping despite its 
costs. For example, if a student believes studying, reading the textbook, and talking to the 
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professor won’t help her grade on an upcoming exam, she would be highly anxious about failing 
the exam, and therefore engage in preemptive excuse making in order to protect herself from that 
future failure. 
Fear of failure, then, seems to motivate both the use of self-handicapping and proactive 
self-control. However, even when a handicapper has a distal goal like good grades, in situations 
with high fear of failure, self-protection takes priority over the pursuit of those distal goals and 
thus necessitates the use of handicapping over the potential use of proactive strategies. 
Self-Protection Through Forgoing Self-Control 
 In such situations with high fear of failure where self-protection wins out, chronic self-
handicappers have a plethora of behaviors and claims to choose from in order to externalize a 
potential failure. As stated earlier, the literature often makes a distinction in handicaps that are 
claimed versus behavioral (Hirt et al., 1991). However, few mentions are made between 
handicaps involving actions versus inactions. Specifically, most self-handicaps involve doing a 
negative behavior or making a negative claim. For example, individuals could take a drug 
(Berglas & Jones, 1978), listen to distracting music (Rhodewalt, Morf, Hazlett, & Fairfield, 
1991), or claim to have test anxiety (Smith, Snyder, & Handelsman, 1982), or a negative mood 
(Baumgardner, Lake, & Arkin, 1985). Handicappers also have another option, however: 
inactions. These types of handicaps involve not doing a positive behavior or making a claim of 
abstaining from something positive.  For example, individuals could withdraw study effort 
before a test (Hirt et al., 1991) or claim a lack of sleep. 
In the current work, I propose a new type of handicapping through inaction that has not 
been examined in the literature to date. Specifically, I examine if chronic self-handicappers 
strategically avoid proactive acts of self-control in order to shift attributions of potential failure 
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away from the self. Similar to active behavioral self-handicaps like drinking alcohol or effort 
withdrawal (Berglas & Jones, 1978; Hirt et al., 1991), avoiding proactive self-control can 
provide a plausible explanation for future failure that is external to the individual. For example, 
one often-used proactive strategy for students is to turn off Wi-Fi on their laptops while studying 
for an exam. This proactive behavior removes the temptation of social media and other internet 
sites, thus bypassing the need for the student to engage in reactive self-control and increasing the 
likelihood of successful studying. However, leaving the Wi-Fi on could provide a ready-made 
excuse for a future poor performance. Specifically, if failure occurs, the student could blame the 
distracting internet for the failure. Thus, forgoing proactive strategies could externalize failure in 
the same way traditional behavioral self-handicaps do. 
The Current Studies 
 In this dissertation, I examine if chronic self-handicappers will both engage in actions and 
inactions to externalize future failure. Specifically, I predict that when individuals are in a 
situation where fear of failure is high, chronic handicappers will forgo proactive self-control as a 
self-handicapping strategy. This will happen regardless of the handicapper’s pursuit of other 
distal goals, because in situations of high fear of failure, self-protection takes precedence over 
achievement goals. Other individuals, though, won’t be as motivated by self-protection in these 
situations. For these non-self-handicappers, I predict that their distal achievement goals will take 
precedence, and they will instead engage in more proactive self-control when those individuals 
are good self-regulations who fear self-control failure. 
Overview of Experiments 
I designed three studies to examine these basic predictions. In Study 1, online participants 
completed measures of trait self-handicapping and self-control. They then imagined studying for 
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an important upcoming exam and rated how likely they were to engage in good habits (including 
proactive self-control strategies), bad habits, and ambiguous habits that are viewed as 
simultaneously helpful and distracting. My main prediction was that HSH would engage in less 
good habits, regardless of their level of self-control ability. LSH, who are not chronically 
motivated by self-protection, would instead act based on their trait self-control such that LSH 
with HSC would be more likely to engage in good habits, and LSH with LSC would be less 
likely to engage in good habits.  
In Study 2, I investigated if these effects only hold when participants experienced high 
fear about potential failure. As discussed above, past work finds that traditional, actional self-
handicaps are motivated by a fear of failure (e.g. Hirt et al. 2000); therefore, demonstrating 
inactions are motivated by the same mechanism of fear will be important. To demonstrate this 
motivation, I had online participants’ rate their trait handicapping and self-control abilities along 
with a measure of fear over failing to meet health goals. Participants then planned a fictitious day 
around a list of provided activities, including exercising. One proactive strategy participants 
could use to ensure they meet their exercise goal is to exercise early in the day before other 
unexpected commitments and challenges get in the way of the exercising. Thus, I predicted that 
HSH would forgo the proactive strategy of exercising early in the day; however, this would only 
occur when they were concerned they could not achieve their health goals. 
Finally, in Study 3, I examined if the forgoing of proactive self-control is strategic. Past 
research (Eyink et al., 2017) finds that handicappers need cognitive resources to work through 
the attributional consequences of their handicap. This suggests that handicappers are strategically 
thinking through when to use handicaps and if they will appropriately excuse their poor 
performance. To determine if handicappers use inactions in same manner as actions, I 
9  
investigated if individuals only forgo proactive self-control when cognitive resources are 
available. To do this, participants’ trait handicapping was assessed. Participants’ self-control 
resources were then depleted or not. Next, I manipulated the viability of a handicap by telling 
participants their choice of study partner did or did not affect performance. Participants then 
picked a bad or good study partner for an upcoming test. One proactive strategy participants 
could use to ensure they meet their studying goal is to surround themselves with good studying 
partners. Thus, I predicted HSH would forgo the proactive strategy of picking a good partner; 
however, this would only occur when the handicap was viable (i.e. when told partner choice 
affects performance), and when they had the resources necessary to work through the 
attributional benefits of the handicap (i.e. when they were not depleted). 
Study 1 
 To first examine my basic hypothesis that individuals can handicap through inactions, I 
examined an imagined situation where fear of failure is high. Specifically, individuals were 
asked to imagine an important exam was coming up and rate how likely they were to engage in 
various behaviors piloted to be unambiguously helpful (i.e. “Good habits”; these included 
proactive acts of self-control), unambiguously distracting (“Bad habits”), or both helpful and 
distracting (i.e. “Ambiguous”). 
 I hypothesized that self-handicapping would predict participants’ likelihood to engage in 
bad habits. Although these particular harmful behaviors have not been studied as a behavioral 
self-handicap before, their negative impact on performance parallels that of established self-
handicaps such as effort withdrawal (Hirt et al. 1991), distracting music (Rhodewalt & Davison, 
1984), and drinking alcohol (Kolditz & Arkin, 1982). Therefore, HSH should engage in more 
bad habits than LSH. Similarly, HSH should also engage in more ambiguous habits as they also 
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provide a ready-made excuse for poor performance. Chronic handicappers might be particularly 
drawn to these types of behaviors as they provide more attributional ambiguity to the 
handicapper. Specifically, since these ambiguous items (e.g. studying in a communal library 
area) have both positive and negative components, they might enable a handicapper to sabotage 
themselves (e.g. studying in a loud environment with lots of people is distracting) while 
simultaneously providing a justification for engaging in the behavior to protect themselves from 
interpersonal costs (e.g. I went there to get away from my roommates). In contrast to bad and 
ambiguous habits, I hypothesized HSH would engage in less good habits than LSH. This type of 
self-handicap through inaction would still serve to create an excuse for poor performance, just by 
refraining from helpful behaviors instead of engaging in risky ones. 
 I also hypothesized effects of self-control on predicted behaviors. Because self-control 
involves both acting in desired ways and not acting in undesired ways (de Ridder, de Boer, 
Lugtig, Bakker, & van Hooft, 2011; de Ridder, Lensvelt-Mulders, Finkenauer, Stok, & 
Baumeister, 2012), I predicted individuals with HSC would be less likely to engage in bad habits 
and more likely to engage in good habits than those with LSC. Because ambiguous habits are, by 
definition, both good and bad – the effect of self-control on these actions is less clear and was 
left up to empirical analysis. 
 Finally, I predicted an interaction between self-handicapping and self-control such that 
self-protection will supersede self-regulatory concerns in this situation designed to elicit failure 
concern. Thus HSH, regardless of self-control, should be more likely to engage in bad and 
ambiguous habits, and less likely to engage in good habits than LSH. For those without chronic 
handicapping tendencies, their self-control habits would instead predict behavior such that LSH 
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with HSC will be unlikely to engage in bad habits but likely to engage in good habits, while LSH 
with LSC will be unlikely to perform good habits and likely to perform bad habits.  
Method 
Participants 
111 introductory psychology students at Indiana University – Bloomington participated 
in this study to fulfill a course requirement. The sample was young (M = 19.48), female (N=77), 
and White (N = 64). 
To determine sample size, I examined extant literature for general rules. If there are five 
or less predictors, Harris (1985) suggests a sample size of N = 50 + P, where P is the number of 
predictors. Green (1991) suggests a minimum sample size of N = 50 +8P. VanVoorhis and 
Morgan (2007) suggest a sample of N= 30P. In this study, I had three predictors, thus sample 
size suggestions range from 53 to 90. To ensure adequate power, I planned to collect data from 
100 participants. 111 unique participants enrolled and completed the main dependent variables of 
the study, and they constitute the final sample. 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants enrolled in an online study. After providing consent, participants answered 
demographic questions including age, gender, race, socioeconomic status, political ideology, 
GPA, and major. Next participants completed measures of trait self-handicapping (Jones & 
Rhodewalt, 1982) and self-regulatory ability (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). 
Participants then read:  
“Imagine you have a final exam in a course that is very important to you and your future 
career. Your teacher tells you that students who do well on this final tend to go on to get 
better jobs and earn higher salaries after graduation. You have received good grades in 
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the class thus far, but you aren’t exactly sure how you managed to get such high scores. 
Even though your teacher mentioned during office hours that she thinks you will do great 
on the final, you are concerned that you won’t be able to replicate your high grades and 
might fail the exam. It’s the weekend before the exam, and you’re getting ready to 
study.”  
This prompt was designed to elicit high levels of uncertainty and fear of failure amongst 
participants. Similar to providing participants non-contingent success feedback (e.g. Hirt et al., 
2000), this prompt should increase the likelihood of self-handicapping. 
Participants then rated how likely they were to engage in a set of study habits. 
Participants answered questions about the location of their studying (e.g. studying at a coffee 
house or library), their preferred partners for studying (e.g. alone or with friends), what items 
they bring with them to study (e.g. cellphone, lecture notes), what activities they engage in while 
studying (e.g. checking email, making flashcards), and any proactive strategies they use to help 
keep them on task (e.g. turning off Wi-Fi capability).  
Behaviors were generated from studies examining the harmful effect of electronic 
devices, study partners, and distracting environments on performance (Calderwood, Ackermen, 
& Conklin, 2014; Calderwood, Green, Joy-Gaba, & Moloney, 2016; David, Kim, Brickman, 
Ran, & Curtis, 2015; Reaves, Graham, Grahn, Rabannifard, & Duarte, 2015; Rodrigues & 
Pandeirada, 2015; Ward, Duke, Gneezy, & Bos, 2017; Xu, Fan, & Du, 2016; Karpicke, Butler, & 
Roediger, 2009) as well as an informal survey of current undergraduate and graduate students. 
Pilot tests assessed whether students saw these behaviors as helpful or harmful to studying, and 
three composite measures were created (see Appendix 1 for full measures and details of the pilot 
testing). First was a measure of “good habits” that are unambiguously helpful to students’ 
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studying (e.g. studying in a private area at the library, bringing my notes and textbook to a study 
session). These items were all rated as helpful, and not distracting (helpful ratings α=.788, 
distracting ratings α=.883). Second was a measure of “bad habits” that are unambiguously 
distracting to a students’ studying (e.g. watching a movie while studying, bringing my cellphone 
to a study session). These items were all rated as distracting, and not helpful (helpful ratings 
α=.687, distracting ratings α=.699). Finally, I created a measure of “ambiguous habits” that are 
both helpful and distracting to studying goals. For example, studying in a communal area at the 
library is helpful, since it is away from the distractions of roommates; however, it also provides 
the distraction of people watching and a louder environment. Ambiguous items were all rated as 
both distracting and helpful (helpful ratings α=.708, distracting ratings α=.682).  
After answering these questions, participants were debriefed and directed to the study 
website to receive credit. 
Results  
Descriptive Analyses 
 As in previous studies (Uysal & Knee, 2012; Gitter, 2008), a strong negative correlation 
between trait self-handicapping and self-regulatory ability was found (r = -.639, p < .001). A 
scatterplot of the relationship between these variables can be seen in Figure 1. 
Main Analyses 
I conducted linear regression analyses with trait self-handicapping, self-regulatory ability, 
and their interaction as centered predictors of participants’ scores on the composite measures of 
good, bad, and ambiguous habits. Main effects were assessed in an initial block, and interactions 
were assessed in a secondary block. 
“Bad Habits” - Actions that unambiguously harm performance 
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The primary block assessing main effects on bad habits was significant, F(2, 104) = 
9.381, p < .001. The main effects explained 15% of the variance in the use of bad habits (R² = 
.153) and this change in R² was significant (F(2, 104) = 9.381, p < .001). I found a main effect of 
trait self-handicapping (B = .773, t(104) = 2.913, p = .004) such that HSH are more likely to 
engage in bad habits than LSH. Contrary to my hypotheses, I did not find a main effect of self-
control (B = -.133, t(104) = -.600, p=.550).  
The secondary block assessing interactions was also significant, F(3, 103) = 8.697, p < 
.001. Introducing these interactions explained an additional 5% of the variance in the use of bad 
habits (R² = .202), and this change in R² was significant (F(1, 103) = 6.362, p = .013). The 
interaction between self-handicapping and self-regulation was significant (B = -6.97, t(103) = -
2.522, p = .013, see Figure 2). To explore this interaction further, I conducted a simple slopes 
analysis in which the effect of self-control was examined at high (+1 SD) and low (-1SD) levels 
of self-handicapping.  LSH, regardless of their amount of self-control ability, were unlikely to 
engage in bad habits (B = .103, t(103) = .437, p = .663).  HSH’s actions were dictated by their 
level of self-control (B = -.607, t(103) = -2.119, p = .036): HSH with low self-control engaged in 
more bad habits than HSH with high self-control. 
“Good habits” - Actions that unambiguously help performance 
The primary block assessing main effects on good habits was not significant, F(2, 104) = 
.244, p = .784. The main effects explained 0.5% of the variance in the use of bad habits (R² = 
.005) and this change in R² was not significant (F(2, 104) = .244, p < .784). Contrary to 
hypotheses, I found no significant main effect of self-handicapping (B = .049, t(104) = .237, p = 
.813) or self-control (B = .113, t(104) = .657, p = .513). The secondary block assessing 
interactions was also not significant, F(3, 103) = .243, p = .866. Introducing these interactions 
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explained an additional 0.2% of the variance in the use of bad habits (R² = .007), and this change 
in R² was not significant (F(1, 103) = .245, p = .622). The interaction between self-handicapping 
and self-control was non-significant (B = .109, t(103) = .495, p = .622). 
“Ambiguous habits” – Actions that both help and hurt performance 
The primary block assessing main effects on ambiguous habits was significant, F(2, 104) 
= 3.955, p = .022. The main effects explained 7% of the variance in the use of bad habits (R² = 
.071) and this change in R² was significant (F(2, 104) = 3.955, p = .022). However, I found no 
significant main effect of self-handicapping (B = .244, t(104) = 1.250, p = .214) or self-control 
(B = -.185, t(104) = -1.137, p = .258). The secondary block assessing interactions was marginally 
significant, F(3, 103) = 2.679, p = .051. Introducing these interactions only explained an 
additional 0.2 % of the variance in the use of bad habits (R² = .072), and this change in R² was 
not significant (F(1, 103) = .190, p = .664). The interaction between self-handicapping and self-
control was therefore unsurprisingly non-significant (B = -.091, t(103) = -.436, p = .664). 
Exploratory Gender Analysis 
Because past work often finds a gender difference such that men engage in actional 
behavioral handicaps while women do not (e.g. McCrea et al., 2008), I examined whether the 
effects above would differ by gender. I conducted additional linear regression analyses adding 
gender as a main effect to block 1, and its interaction terms to blocks 2 and 3.  
Adding gender to the model for bad habits yielded no significant main effects or 
interactions with gender. Further all main effects and interactions described above remained 
significant with gender in the model. 
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Adding gender to the model for good habits yielded a significant main effect of gender (B 
= .471, t(104) = 2.632, p = .010) such that females engaged in more good habits than males. No 
other effects were found. 
Finally, adding gender to the model for ambiguous habits yielded a marginally significant 
main effect of gender (B = .319, t(104) = 1.853, p = .067) such that females engaged in 
marginally more ambiguous habits than males. No other effects were found. 
Discussion 
In Study 1, I primarily replicated basic self-handicapping findings that those high in trait 
self-handicapping (HSH) were more likely to engage in negative actions, specifically to use bad 
study habits, than those low in self-handicapping (LSH). Although these particular behaviors 
have not been examined in the literature before, this result points to the ubiquity of handicapping 
amongst student populations and helps to provide converging evidence that these “bad habits” 
are indeed distracting to students. 
However, this tendency to engage in bad study habits was moderated by self-control. 
Contrary to my initial predictions, only chronic handicappers with poor self-control engaged in 
these bad habits, while chronic handicappers with good self-control engaged in fewer of them. 
Thus, it seems that self-regulatory tendencies overwhelmed any motivation to engage in self-
protection.  
This might have occurred simply because there was not enough variance amongst the 
variables in the data set. In looking at Figure 1 of the scatter plot of the relationship between self-
handicapping and self-control, it seems that most individuals were either high handicappers with 
low-self-control, or low handicappers with high self-control with few individuals falling into the 
other possible quadrants. Due to this lack of variance, it’s very unlikely I’d be able to find 
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chronic handicappers with good self-control in the sample doing anything, much less engaging in 
handicapping through inactions! This lack of variance will be addressed in Study 3, where self-
control is manipulated instead of measured. 
However, we might also see self-control overwhelming self-protecting because 
individuals were not feeling enough fear of failure for self-protection to be prioritized over other 
important distal goals. Although piloted to ensure participants would be anxious, it is possible 
the imagined scenario did not engender enough concern amongst our sample. This pattern (or 
lack thereof) seems to point to a growing body of work that shows that hypothetical situations 
are not always the psychological equivalent of in-vivo experiences (e.g. Bostyn, Sevenhant, & 
Roets, 2018). Thus, in Study 3, we tested these same basic predictions with an in-lab paradigm to 
see if these results hold when the situation is more realistic, and perhaps more threatening. 
Further, the effect of failure concerns on the use of proactive self-control will be directly tested 
in Study 2; thus, I will return to this point later in the paper. 
Perhaps most striking was the lack of any significant effects on good habits. The lack of 
any self-handicapping main effect or interaction on good habits provides initial evidence that the 
basic supposition of this paper is incorrect – perhaps individuals don’t use inactions to excuse 
poor performance. However, there could be an issue with the way we measured good habits. 
When creating the good habits measure, I combined items that are traditionally helpful for 
studying (e.g. textbook, making study guides, studying in a private area) with proactive strategies 
for studying (e.g. turning off Wi-Fi, using the Pomodoro technique). Although participants rated 
both the more traditionally good items and the proactive items as helpful and not distracting, the 
amount they reported using the items differed. On average, pilot participants reported using the 
traditionally good items often (M = 5.256, 1-7 scale), while reporting infrequent use of the 
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proactive strategies (M = 2.658, 1-7 scale). So although these items are viewed the same in terms 
of helpfulness and distraction, they might not combine well into a single measure. To test this, I 
conducted additional exploratory analyses wherein I created two new composite measures: a 
proactive habits score (consisting of all proactive strategies), and a good habits score without 
proactive strategies included. I then reran the regressions to see if my results would differ based 
on a different conceptualization of “good habit”. Regardless of the way I measured “good habit” 
no significant effect or interaction was found. This provides additional, converging evidence that 
my basic hypothesis is incorrect. However, just like one study doesn’t “prove” an effect, one 
failed study does not “prove” an effect does not exist. Particularly because this measure was not 
previously validated, it will be important to examine this hypothesis using other paradigms and 
procedures. Thus, this same basic hypothesis will be tested in Studies 2 and 3.  
Non-significant effects on ambiguous behaviors are perhaps more intriguing. As our past 
work indicates (Eyink et al., 2017), self-handicapping is a cognitively costly strategy because 
individuals must think through the attributional implications of their actions. Although 
ambiguous habits might afford an interpersonal savings by providing a reasonable justification 
for engaging in a less-than-ideal studying behavior, this lack of a main effect implies handicaps 
must be clearly and easily tied to failure. If the tie between engaging in the habit and failure isn’t 
clear, handicappers don’t seem to use it – and instead choose unambiguously distracting habits 
that clearly hurt their performance. 
Finally, though, the lack of a self-control main effect on good habits flies directly in the 
face of past findings that high trait self-control predicts doing good, proactive behaviors (e.g. 
Ent, Baumeister, & Tice, 2015; de Ridder et al, 2012). Remember, though, that Delose et al. 
(2015) found that individuals only engage in proactive self-control when concern over failure is 
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high. Although I did not directly test participants’ concerns over self-regulatory failure, the use 
of an imagined scenario and the lack of failure concerns seem to point to a similar lack of 
concern over self-control failure as well. 
Study 2 
Although Study 1 demonstrated that chronic handicappers engage in bad, risky behaviors, 
it failed to provide evidence that they also fail to engage in good, proactive behaviors. As 
discussed above, this could be due to a dearth of failure concerns amongst my participants. 
Because this fear is a necessary precursor for handicapping (Hirt et al. 2000), I attempted to 
create a threatening situation in Study 1 by describing the exam as important and meaningful to 
the student. It seems, however, this scenario did not successfully meet this goal. Thus, in Study 
2, I directly measure and assess fear of failure and use it to predict the use of good, proactive 
behaviors in the domain of health by adapting a previously validated methodology (Delose et al., 
2015).  
Although much of the work in self-handicapping and self-regulation involve students, the 
implications of this research are applicable to any domain individuals’ value successful goal 
pursuit in, including health. In the current study, I therefore not only hope to demonstrate my 
basic effect in a more generalizable domain but also further elucidate the motivation behind their 
actions. Specifically, I hope to demonstrate that chronic self-handicappers refrain from proactive 
self-control processes that would help them meet their health goals, but only when fear of failure 
is high.  
In Study 2, online participants complete measures of trait self-handicapping, self-control, 
and concern with failing to meet health goals. Next, participants plan out their day – including 
when they will wake up and exercise. Our main dependent variable is how much time 
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participants wait to exercise after waking up. Previous work (Delose et al., 2015) finds that good 
self-regulators proactively exercise soon after waking in order to avoid any unexpected 
distractions and tiny emergencies that pop up during the day and derail exercising. Thus, similar 
to my predictions in Study 1, I expected a main effect of self-handicapping such that HSH would 
forgo proactive self-control by waiting to exercise until later in the day that LSH. I also expected 
a main effect of self-control ability such that successful self-regulators would plan to exercise 
earlier than unsuccessful self-regulators. Finally, I predicted a main effect of fear of failure such 
that participants who were more concerned with failure would plan to exercise earlier that those 
who were unconcerned.  
I further hypothesized a qualification of these results by significant two-way interactions. 
I predicted a self-regulation by fear of failure interaction such that self-regulatory ability would 
only predict exercise time when fear of failure was high. Further, I expected a self-handicapping 
by self-regulation interaction. HSH, regardless of self-regulatory ability, would exercise later in 
the day. LSH’s plans would be determined by self-control capability such that LSH who had 
high self-regulatory skills would exercise early in the day, while LSH who had low self-
regulation would exercise late in the day. Finally, I expected a significant 3-way interaction such 
that HSH would only exercise late in the day when they felt a high amount of fear of failure; 
LSH with high self-regulatory skills would only exercise early in the day when they feared 
failing at their health goals.  
Method 
Participants 
310 adults (N=223 female, N=243 White, M𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎= 47.74) who enrolled in Qualtrics 
research panels participated in this study for $5 compensation. Adults over the age of 18 living in 
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the United States and who spoke fluent English were eligible to participate. I chose to use an 
adult sample as previous work found that although appearance concerns are high in student 
samples (Crocker, Luhtanen, Cooper, & Bouvrette, 2003), concern over having a healthy diet 
and routine exercise are more prevalent among older adults (Neumark-Sztainer, Rock, 
Thornquist, Cheskin, Neuhouser, & Barnett, 2000). 
To determine sample size, I again used recommendations from existing literature. If you 
have six or more predictors, Harris (1985) suggests a minimum sample size of N = 10P, where P 
is the number of predictors. Green (1991) suggests a sample size of N = 50 +8P. VanVoorhis and 
Morgan (2007) suggest a sample of N= 30P. In this study, I have seven predictors, thus sample 
size suggestions range from 57 to 210. Although I had funding to obtain 200 participants, due to 
technical issues with Qualtrics panels, we received a final sample of 310 participants who met all 
requirements and correctly completed all our main dependent measures; these individuals 
constitute our final sample. 
Procedure 
Participants first answered demographic questions assessing age, gender, race, height, 
weight, socioeconomic status, and political ideology. Trait level self-handicapping (Jones & 
Rhodewalt, 1982) and self-regulatory ability (Tangney et al., 2004) were then measured. Finally, 
participants answered questions about their fears over failing to meet their health goals (adapted 
from Hirt et al., 2000) and commitment to and difficulty with health goals (adapted from Delose 
et al., 2015). For full adapted measures, please see Appendix 2. 
Based on the procedure of Delose et al. (2015), participants saw an empty agenda sheet 
with one-hour timeslots running from 5am to 4am. Participants then planned when they would 
complete each of the following 1-hour activities: exercise, making an unpleasant phone call, 
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laundry, applying for a new job. Finally, participants indicated what time they would wake up 
and go to sleep, as well as any other activities they might do during the day (see Appendix 2 for 
the full agenda item). After completing the agenda, participants were probed for suspicion and 
were compensated through Qualtrics panels. 
Results 
Descriptive Analyses 
 As in Study 1, a strong negative correlation between trait self-handicapping and self-
regulatory ability was found (r = -.738, p < .001). A scatterplot of the relationship between these 
variables can be seen in Figure 3. 
Main Analyses 
To account for variability in planned wakeup time and to control for the potential that 
successful self-regulators wake up earlier in the day (as recommended in Delose et al,. 2015), I 
first subtracted the time participants planned to wake up from the time they plan to exercise. This 
deviation score served as my main dependent variable for this study. Next, I created a composite 
measure of health fear of failure by combining my measures of fear of failing to meet health 
goals and difficulty with maintaining health goals (α = .869). Finally, I conducted linear 
regression analyses with trait self-handicapping, self-regulatory ability, health fear of failure, and 
their interactions as predictors of the deviation score, or the amount of hours between waking up 
and exercising. Main effects were assessed in an initial block, 2-way interactions were assessed 
in a secondary block, and 3-way interactions were assessed in a final block. 
The primary block assessing main effects on exercise deviation times was significant, 
F(3, 306) = 3.036, p = .029. The main effects explained 3% of the variance in exercise times (R² 
= .029) and this change in R² was significant (F(3, 306) = 3.036, p = .029). Contrary to 
23  
hypotheses, I did not find a main effect of either self-control (B =         -.669, t(306) = -1.335, p = 
.183) or self-handicapping (B = -.552, t(306) = -.905, p = .336). However, a significant effect of 
health fear of failure was found (B = .361, t(306) = 1.971, p = .050) such that individuals who 
were more concerned over failing to meet their health goals waited longer to exercise after 
waking up.  
The secondary block assessing 2-way interactions was also significant, F(6, 303) = 2.195, 
p = .043. Introducing these interactions only explained an additional 1% of the variance in 
exercise time (R² = .042), and this change in R² was not significant (F(3, 303) = 1.344, p = .260). 
The interactions between self-handicapping and self-control (B = .368, t(303) = .525, p = .600) 
and self-handicapping and health fear of failure (B = -.547, t(303) = -1.199, p = .232) were both 
not significant. However, a significant interaction between self-control and health fear of failure 
was found (B = -.646, t(303) = -1.977, p = .049, see Figure 4). To explore this interaction further, 
I conducted a simple slopes analysis in which the effect of health fear of failure was examined at 
high (+1 SD) and low (-1SD) levels of self-control.  Individuals with HSC, regardless of their 
health goal fears, exercised soon after waking up (B = .164, t(303) = .700, p = .484). Individuals 
with LSC are affected by their health fears of failure (B = .433, t(303) = 2.033, p = .043): those 
worried about meeting their health goals put off working out until later in the day than those who 
were not worried. 
The final block assessing 3-way interactions was marginally significant, F(7, 302) = 
1.907, p = .068. Introducing these interactions only explained an additional 0.1% of the variance 
in exercise times (R² = .042), and this change in R² was not significant (F(1, 302) = .212, p = 
.645). Unsurprisingly, the interaction between self-handicapping, self-control, and health fear of 
failure was not significant (B = .132, t(302) = .461, p = .645). 
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Exploratory Gender Analysis 
As in Study 1, I also examined if gender would potentially moderate the effects described 
above. To do so, I conducted additional linear regressions, adding gender as a main effect in 
block 1 and to interaction terms in blocks 2, 3, and 4. Adding gender to the model yielded no 
significant main effects or interactions with gender. Further all main effects and interactions 
described above remained significant with gender in the model. 
Exploratory Health Importance Analysis 
 Because past work finds that the importance of the distal goal is an important determinant 
in whether or not an individual will use a proactive self-control process, over and above the 
amount of fear of failure they feel (Delose et al., 2015), I also examined if health goal 
importance would moderate the effects described above. 
 Overall, I found a strong negative relationship between fear of failing at a health goal and 
the importance of the health goal (r = -.550, p < .001). When I added health importance in as a 
separate predictor to the linear regression analysis both in the main effects of block 1 and the 
interaction terms in blocks 2, 3, and 4, I found the new model  
yielded only a marginally significant 4-way interaction between trait self-handicapping, self-
regulatory ability, fear of health goal failure, and health goal importance (B = -.420, t(294) = -
1.798, p = .073). No other main effects or interactions were found and the overall model was 
non-significant, R² = .061, F(15, 294) = 1.276, p = .216. 
Discussion 
 In Study 2, I primarily found that the amount of fear someone feels over failing a goal is 
an important determinant over whether they engage in the proactive strategy of exercising soon 
after waking. Specifically, those who were more concerned with failing put off exercising until 
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later in the day; or, in other words, the more concerned someone was with failing, the less likely 
they were to use proactive self-control. Thus, unlike in Study 1, we can see that in certain 
situations where self-protection concerns are elevated, an individual might respond by engaging 
in inactions or by forgoing proactive self-control. This result jives with past research on 
procrastination finding that fear of failure is a prime motivator of putting pressing activities off 
until tomorrow (Solomon and Rothblum, 1984). 
 Although this result seems promising insomuch that self-protection is motivating 
inaction, I did not find that chronic self-handicappers were more likely to engage in this behavior 
than non-handicappers. Instead, much like in Study 1, self-control moderates the effect. Only 
those who are bad at self-control and felt fear over failing put off exercising until later in the day. 
This was not further moderated by trait self-handicapping. Again, this could be due to a strong 
correlation between self-control and self-handicapping, leading to a lack of variability amongst 
participants. However, taken together with Study 1, this lack of a handicapping effect provides 
mounting evidence that handicappers don’t forgo proactive self-control in order to excuse a 
failure through inaction. Nevertheless, this basic hypothesis will be examined again in Study 3 
using an in-person paradigm to create the best conditions under which an individual might 
experience the type of fear over failure they would experience in an in-vivo handicapping 
situation. 
 Interestingly, I also found that good self-regulators in our study tended to exercise soon 
after waking (i.e. they are more likely to engage in proactive self-control), regardless of how 
much fear over failure they felt. This result directly contradicts previous research by Delose et al. 
(2015) that found good self-regulators exercised earlier in the day, but only if they felt the need 
to engage that proactive strategy due to concerns over fear of failure. Perhaps this puzzling 
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contradiction occurred because of differences in Delose and colleagues’ (2015) and the current 
study’s choice in participants. In previous work, researchers used a convenience sample of 
college students; however, in the current study, I chose to use an adult population. As stated in 
the methods section, this choice was made so as to have a sample with a high overall concern 
with health in order to increase the chance we might see handicapping behavior. However, this 
choice might have had the unintentional side effect of restricting participants’ schedules.  
Today’s students must balance many different courses, extracurricular activities, and 
social engagements (Hanson, Drumheller, Mallard, McKee, & Schlegel, 2010); however, these 
activities tend to be flexible. For example, although a student must attend class at a certain time 
every week, when she works on the assignments for that class is up to her discretion. If a college 
student was worried about failing a test, she would need to move around her daily activities to 
enable her to tackle studying before any unanticipated emails, party invitations, etc. appeared and 
distracted her from her goal. This is possible to do because her activities are movable and 
flexible. However, if that student was not worried about failing the test, she could study at 
whatever time is most convenient. Thus, in student samples, fear over failure will likely predict 
when good self-regulators engage in self-control. 
Adults, on the other hand, might have less flexibility due to different types of 
responsibilities including full-time jobs and child care. For example, if a parent wakes up at 5am, 
they might only have 1 hour to themselves before they need to begin getting their children ready 
to go to school before they themselves go to work. School start time and work start time are both 
inflexible and non-movable. After work, they might need to prepare dinner, entertain children, 
and give baths, before having to head to bed themselves. Although these activities are somewhat 
flexible (e.g. eating dinner at 6 vs. 6:30), the order isn’t changeable (e.g. you can’t put the kids to 
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bed before making dinner). The structure of adults’ days might therefore already reflect a type of 
proactive self-control where they know they only have small amounts of time to get things done. 
Thus, whether or not they feel fear that they might fail at their goal, adults could only work on a 
task during those small pockets of time. This supposition is descriptively confirmed through 
open-ended questions at the end of the experiment. We asked participants to explain in 1-2 
sentences why they chose their exercise time. Many participants explained that this was the only 
time they had open during their day and they wanted to tackle their exercise goals before moving 
on to other responsibilities. For example, one participant explained she picked that time to 
exercise because “…my child would still be asleep, so I could get exercise in without any 
interruptions”, while another participant explained “I like to get it done, showered, and move on 
with the rest of the day.” Thus, due to the sample we used, there simply might not be the ability 
for as much flexibility and therefore evaluative concern may not exert as much of an effect on 
adults with fixed schedules. 
 Beyond sampling differences, there were limitations of the implementation of this study 
that lead me to be hesitant of drawing strong conclusions about its results. In hindsight, the use 
of an online agenda item was less than ideal. Due to programming limitations, we were unable to 
have participants select an item and drop one, and only one, item into each time slot. Instead 
participants had to select a time from a drop-down menu for each item. This led to much 
confusion amongst participants – and many participants had to be replaced through the Qualtrics 
panel for failing to follow instructions and only select one activity per one-hour time block. 
Further, several participants were replaced for selecting exercise times that occurred before 
waking up or after going to sleep. Descriptively, then, it seems that although the online item 
allowed us to collect data quickly, it led to confusion and subpar data. Thus, it is important to 
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again examine the basic suppositions of this paper using another paradigm, as described in Study 
3. 
Study 3 
Studies 1 and 2 provide converging evidence that handicappers do not forgo proactive 
self-control in order to engage in self-protection. However, both of these studies attempted to 
demonstrate this effect using online samples and hypothetical situations. Past work (e.g. Bostyn, 
Sevenhant, & Roets, 2018) finds that imagined scenarios often differ from real experiences, thus 
I examined the basic predictions of this paper again using an in-lab procedure.  
Further, in both Studies 1 & 2, I found strong correlations between trait level 
handicapping and trait self-control, perhaps leading to a lack of effects due to an absence of 
variance in the data. In this study, I artificially created variance by directly manipulating the 
ability to engage in self-control. This should create HSH who have the ability to engage in self-
control and LSH who do not have the ability to engage in self-control, two quadrants of 
participants missing from past studies. 
Additionally, in Study 2, I found initial evidence that some individuals forgo proactive 
self-control when motivated to do so through fear of failure. However, the motivation behind this 
abstinence is unclear. Putting off exercising when failure looms could be motivated by a 
willingness to externalize that failure as is the case with self-handicapping (e.g. Berglas & Jones, 
1978); an individual could hope that by waiting to exercise until later in the day, other 
commitments and challenges are bound to get in the way, creating an external justification for 
failing to achieve their exercise goal. In contrast, putting off exercising could also be motivated 
by more simple hedonic concerns: an individual who fears failure might want to avoid the 
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negative experience of failure, and so put off the task until later, as is the case in procrastination 
(e.g. Ferarri et al. 1995). 
Thus, in Study 3, I attempt to untangle to true motivational underpinning behind forgoing 
proactive self-control.  To do so, I manipulate the presence of a viable handicap in the research 
paradigm. Specifically, all participants are told they will be working with a partner on an 
important task. Half of participants are told that the partner they choose has a large effect on their 
score on this task, such that picking a good partner will positively affect their score and picking a 
bad partner will negatively affect their score. Thus, for these participants, a viable handicap is 
present – if motivated to do so, an individual could choose a bad partner in order to sabotage 
their likelihood of success on the task. The other half of participants are told partner choice has 
absolutely no effect on their task score. Thus, for these participants, a viable handicap is not 
present – no matter their motivation, they do not have a ready-made handicap present that can 
externalize and explain away their poor performance. Importantly, previous work (e.g. Hendrix 
& Hirt, 2009) finds that self-handicappers only engage in handicaps when they are viable, 
demonstrating the strategicness of the self-protective process. In Study 3, I hope to replicate this 
basic finding with inactions such that handicappers will only forgo proactive strategies when 
failure to use that strategy has implications for their performance (i.e. when partner choice 
matters). 
Further, past research demonstrates that handicapping only occurs when individuals have 
the cognitive resources available to work through the attributional costs and benefits of the 
strategy (Eyink, Hirt, Hendrix, & Galante, 2017). Thus, if individuals are forgoing proactive self-
control in order to externalize attributions for potential failure, they would also likely need to 
have cognitive resources available to work through the attributions of the strategy. Specifically, 
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in Study 3, I hope to demonstrate that forgoing proactive self-control only occurs when 
individuals are not cognitively depleted. 
In Study 3, participants were brought into the lab to complete a cognitive abilities test 
with a purported partner. I first measured trait handicapping, before cognitively depleting 
participants (or not). Next, I manipulated the viability of a handicap by telling participants their 
choice of study partner did or did not affect performance. Finally, participants reported how 
concerned they felt before picking their partner for the test.  
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, I predicted a main effect of trait self-handicapping on 
proactive self-control such that HSH would be less likely to pick a partner instrumental to 
success and more likely to pick a handicapper that threatens success. I also predicted main 
effects of depletion and handicap viability such that depleted participants and participants 
without a handicap present would be less likely to pick a “good” partner and more likely to pick 
a “bad” partner. 
These main effects should be qualified by interactions. First, I predicted the effect of trait 
handicapping would be moderated by depletion such that HSH would only forgo an instrumental 
partner/pick a threatening partner when not under depletion. Further, this effect should be 
mediated by increased fear of failure. Hirt et al. (2000) finds that chronic self-handicappers feel 
increased fear of failure in performance situations that non-handicappers in the same situation 
simply don’t experience. Thus, even being in the same threatening situation, only individuals 
who experience a high amount of fear should engage in handicapping behavior. 
I also predicted trait handicapping and handicap viability would interact such that HSH 
would be unlikely to pick a “good” partner/likely to pick a “bad” partner when told partner 
choice matters. Finally, I predicted a three-way interaction such that HSH would be less likely to 
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choose a good partner/more likely to choose a bad partner only when the handicap is viable and 
when cognitive resources are available. 
Method 
Participants 
247 introductory psychology students at Indiana University – Bloomington participated 
in this study to fulfill a course requirement. My sample was young (M = 19.12), predominantly 
female (N = 178), and majority White (N=167). 
To determine sample size, I again used recommendations found in the literature. If you 
have six or more predictors, Harris (1985) suggests a minimum sample size of N = 10P, where P 
is the number of predictors. Green (1991) suggests a sample size of N = 50 +8P. VanVoorhis and 
Morgan (2007) suggest a sample of N= 30P. In this study, I have seven predictors, thus sample 
size suggestions range from 57 to 210. To ensure adequate power, I planned to collect data from 
250 participants.  
261 participants enrolled and completed the study; however, 14 participants were 
excluded from analyses based on comments from research assistants who ran participants. 
Comments ranged from computer issues, to non-fluent English speakers, to participants who 
raised serious doubts about the cover story (i.e. they did not believe they would actually interact 
with anyone else). This left 247 participants in the final sample. 
Procedure 
Participants enrolled in a study purportedly about cognitive abilities of students. 
Participants believed they would complete some tasks alone, and other tasks with a partner. To 
ensure participants believed this cover story, we made sure that at least 3 participants were 
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enrolled for a session or that cubicle doors were shut upon entry to the lab and the incoming 
participants were told other students had already begun the experiment.  
Upon arriving at the experimental session, participants first completed a packet of 
measures supposedly for a collaborator at the University of Toronto titled “Personality Styles 
Questionnaire”; however, this cover story was used simply to prevent participants from 
connecting the types of personality measures we assessed to the main measures later in the study. 
This packet contained measures of demographics including age, gender, race/ethnicity, college 
GPA, college major, political ideology, and socio-economic status. Finally, it contained a 
measure of trait self-handicapping (Jones & Rhodewalt, 1982). 
After completing the packet, participants were then provided a new packet of papers, and 
told to follow instructions on the computer. Participants read they would complete a vowel 
recognition task. This task was adapted from Baumeister et al. (1998) and served as my 
manipulation of cognitive depletion. All participants first had up to 5 minutes to cross off every 
instance of the letter e from a scanned page of a statistic book. Half of participants received a 
second scanned page and again had up to 5 minutes to cross off all the e’s. Because this task was 
easy and required no suppression of their dominant, learned response from the first round of e-
crossing, this condition was not cognitively depleting. The other half of participants instead 
received a second scanned page with bad contrast and resolution, making the text difficult to read 
without close attention. These participants had up to 5 minutes to cross off an e only if it was not 
adjacent to a vowel or one letter away from a vowel. Because this task was difficult and required 
suppression of their dominant, learned response from the first round of e-crossing, this condition 
was cognitively depleting. This depleted condition has been used across many studies to deplete 
cognitive resources and reduce the likelihood of future self-control success (e.g. Baumeister et 
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al., 1998). To ensure this manipulation worked, I included measures of motivation (adapted from 
Muraven & Slessareva, 2003; Muraven et al., 2006), perceived depletion, and mental fatigue 
(adapted from Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, & Alexander, 2010; Clarkson, Hirt, Chapman, & Jia, 2011; see 
Appendix 3 for full measures). 
Participants then moved onto a new cognitive task assessing mental flexibility that they 
would work on in pairs. When describing the task, participants also read a bit about its history. 
Embedded in this history was my manipulation of handicap viability. All participants read: 
Before you begin working on the mental flexibility task, we first wanted to tell you more 
about the history of the task. 
For many years, psychologists have been interested in how working with a partner or 
group affects performance. On some tasks, working with a partner seems to enhance 
performance. On other tasks, working with a partner seems to undermine performance. 
On still other tasks, individuals and groups seem to perform equally well. 
Half of participants were assigned to have a viable handicap. As such, we augmented the 
viability of choosing a bad partner/not choosing a good partner as an excuse for poor 
performance. These participants read: 
Recently, psychologists have begun to examine how different kinds of partners can 
differentially affect performance on specific cognitive tasks, including the mental 
flexibility task described earlier.  
In 2016, Cornell University did a study on this flexibility task and found that its scores 
were *highly affected* by the type of partner. If participants were paired with a 
cognitively agile partner, performance increased dramatically from when the participant 
completed the flexibility task individually. However, if participants were paired with a 
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cognitively inept partner, performance decreased dramatically from when the participant 
completed the flexibility task individually. In other words, the type of partner had a large 
effect on participants' mental flexibility scores. 
To further verify this finding, you will complete the mental flexibility task with a partner. 
Half of participants were assigned to have a non-viable handicap. As such, we removed the 
viability of choosing a bad partner/not choosing a good partner as an excuse for poor 
performance. They read: 
Recently, psychologists have begun to examine how different kinds of partners can 
differentially affect performance on specific cognitive tasks, including the mental 
flexibility task described earlier.  
In 2016, Cornell University did a study on this flexibility task and found that its scores 
were *not affected* by the type of partner. Regardless of whether participants were 
paired with a cognitively agile partner or a cognitively inept partner, performance did not 
change compared to when the participant completed the flexibility task individually. In 
other words, the type of partner had no effect on participants' mental flexibility scores. 
To further verify this finding, you will complete the mental flexibility task with a partner.  
This type of manipulation of handicap viability has been successfully used in past handicapping 
studies (adapted from Hendrix & Hirt, 2009). Importantly, it allows researchers to demonstrate 
individuals only use a handicap that provides strategic self-protection and will refrain from 
handicaps that they or others don’t believe cause failure. 
After this manipulation, participants next completed a “Getting to Know You” sheet. As 
part of the cover story of the study, participants believed they would choose a partner for an 
upcoming task from a pool of two other participants. To facilitate their decision, all participants 
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first had to describe themselves. On a sheet with multiple blank lines, participants saw the 
following instructions: “Using the blanks provided, please write a description about yourself. 
That is, describe who you generally are as a person. You might wish to talk about such things as 
your year in school, major, extracurricular activities, and hobbies.” After completing this sheet, 
and while waiting for the other participants to finish their sheets, participants completed a 
measure of evaluative concern (adapted from Hirt et al., 2000; see Appendix 3).  
Based on the procedures of vanDellen et al. (2015), participants finally received copies of 
handwritten “Getting to Know You” sheets from two other participants. All participants received 
the same sheets so as to provide one choice of partner that would help performance (good 
partner), and another choice of partner that would hurt their performance (bad partner). 
The good partner description read: 
I’m a freshman and I plan on majoring in biology, Much of my free time is monopolized 
by homework or studying, but that’s fine because I know that working hard now will be 
better for me in the long run. Outside of school, I enjoy playing volleyball with my 
friends or going for a bike ride or run. I like to volunteer around town when I can to try 
and make it a better place in general, but I don’t always have the time for it with school 
work and all. 
The bad partner description read: 
I’m a freshman and I mostly like hanging out with my friends. I go downtown or to 
parties every once in a while but I can still make time for school work. I’m thinking about 
majoring in business or journalism, but I’m not sure. I still have a lot of time to figure 
that out. 
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They then rated how positively, negatively, close to, and willing to work with both the good and 
bad partners they felt. Finally, they chose which person they would like to work with. After 
answering suspicion probes, participants were debriefed, thanked, and given credit for 
participating. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 To assess whether the depletion measure worked, I first conducted independent samples 
t-tests to see if depleted and non-depleted conditions differed in their mental fatigue, perceived 
depletion, and motivation. Results indicate that the manipulation failed: depleted and non-
depleted conditions did not differ in terms of task motivation (t(245) = -.510, p = .610), 
perceived depletion (t(245) = .743, p = .458), and mental fatigue (t(245) = 1.188, p = .236). 
Creating Composite Measures 
 I next created a composite measure for the impressions of the good and bad partners. I 
first reverse scored the items about negativity, and averaged all items together (positivity, 
closeness, willingness to work with, reversed scored negativity). The composite impressions for 
both the good (α = .695) and bad (α = .843) partners had acceptable reliability. 
Main Analyses 
To analyze this data, I conducted linear regressions with trait self-handicapping, 
depletion manipulation, and handicap viability as predictors of impressions of the good and bad 
partners. Main effects were assessed in an initial block, 2-way interactions were assessed in a 
secondary block, and 3-way interactions were assessed in a final block. 
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Bad Partner Evaluations 
 The primary block assessing main effects on evaluations of the bad partner was 
significant, F(3, 243) = 5.118, p = .002. The main effects explained 6% of the variance in 
impressions (R² = .059) and this change in R² was significant (F(3, 243) = 5.118, p = .002). I 
found a significant main effect of trait self-handicapping (B = .500, t(243) = 3.706, p <.001) such 
that HSH had more positive impressions of the bad partner than LSH. Contrary to hypotheses, no 
other main effects were significant. Therefore the failed depletion manipulation (B = -.174, 
t(243) = -1.153, p = .250) and the handicap viability manipulation (B = .061, t(243) = .407, p = 
.685) were both non-significant. 
 The secondary block assessing two way interactions was also significant, F(6, 240) = 
2.611, p = .018; however, introducing these interactions only explained an additional 0.2% of the 
variance in impressions (R² = .061), and this change in R² was not significant (F(3, 240) = .156, 
p = .926). Unsurprisingly then, no interactions were significant including the interactions 
between the depletion manipulation and partner manipulation (B = .145, t(243) = .477, p = .634), 
the trait self-handicapping by depletion manipulation (B = .112, t(243) = .411, p = .681) and the 
trait self-handicapping by handicap viability manipulation (B = .067, t(243) = .247, p = .805). 
 The final block assessing three way interactions was also significant, F(7, 239) = 2.458, p 
= .019. Again, though, introducing these interactions only explained an additional 0.6% of the 
variance in impressions (R² = .067), and this change in R² was not significant (F(1, 239) = 1.509, 
p = .221). Therefore, the interaction between trait self-handicapping, depletion manipulation and 
handicap viability manipulation was not significant (B = .667, t(243) = 1.228, p = .221). 
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Good Partner Evaluations 
The primary block assessing main effects on evaluations of the good partner was 
significant, F(3, 243) = 12.037, p < .001. The main effects explained 13% of the variance in 
impressions (R² = .129) and this change in R² was significant (F(3, 243) = 12.037, p < .001). I 
found a significant main effect of trait self-handicapping (B = -.552, t(243) = -5.502, p <.001) 
such that HSH had more negative impressions of the good partner than LSH. Contrary to 
hypotheses, no other main effects were significant. Therefore the failed depletion manipulation 
(B = .159, t(243) = 1.415, p = .158) and the handicap viability manipulation (B = -.195, t(243) = 
-1.735, p = .084) were both non-significant. 
 The secondary block assessing two way interactions was also significant, F(6, 240) = 
6.789, p < .001; however, introducing these interactions only explained an additional 2% of the 
variance impressions (R² = .145), and this change in R² was not significant (F(3, 240) = 1.471, p 
= .223). Unsurprisingly, no interactions were significant including the interactions between the 
depletion manipulation and partner manipulation (B = .418, t(243) = 1.863, p = .064), the trait 
self-handicapping by depletion manipulation (B = .153, t(243) = .764, p = .446) and the trait self-
handicapping by handicap viability manipulation (B = -.092, t(243) = -.457, p = .648). 
 The final block assessing three way interactions was also significant, F(7, 239) = 5.795, p 
< .001. Introducing these interactions explained no additional variance in impressions (R² = 
.145), and this change in R² was not significant (F(1, 249) = .001, p = .970). Thus, the interaction 
between trait self-handicapping, depletion manipulation and handicap viability manipulation was 
not significant (B = -.015, t(243) = -.037, p = .970). 
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Mediational Effect of Fear of Failure 
 To further examine the relationship between the effects of trait handicapping and 
impressions of their potential partners, I tested if fear of failure mediated the relationships. This 
could provide some additional evidence that handicappers were choosing the bad partner and 
avoiding the good partner due to self-protection concerns. I tested mediation using Preacher and 
Haye’s (2008) bias-corrected bootstrapping procedure with 10,000 bootstrap resamples. The 
indirect effect of self-handicapping on impressions of the bad partner through fear of failure was 
not significant as the bias corrected 95% confidence interval included zero (-.1015 - .0182). 
Similarly, the bias corrected 95% confidence interval of the indirect effect of self-handicapping 
on impressions of the good partner through fear of failure also contained zero (-.0385 - .0457). 
Further exploration revealed that although trait self-handicapping significantly predicted fear of 
failure (B = .300, t(245) = 2.876, p = .005), fear of failure did not predict impressions of the good 
(B = .016, t(244) = .247, p = .805) or bad partner (B = -.110, t(244) = -1.339, p = .182). 
Exploratory Gender Analysis 
As in Studies 1 and 2, I explored if gender moderated the effects described in the main 
analysis section. To do so, I conducted additional linear regressions, adding gender as a main 
effect in block 1 and to interaction terms in blocks 2, 3, and 4. 
When predicting impressions of the bad partner, no main effects or interactions with 
gender with found. Including gender in the model did not significantly affect the results reported 
in the main analysis section. On evaluations of the good partner, I found a significant main effect 
of gender (B = .372, t(239) = 2.189, p = .030) such that females had more positive evaluations of 
the good partner than males. However, this main effect did not significantly interact with any of 
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our manipulations or variables of interest. Further, including gender in the model did not change 
any of the reported effects. 
Exploratory Partner Choice Analysis 
 After completing ratings of their partners, participants also picked which partner they 
wanted to work with. To examine if our variables of interest affected this choice, I conducted a 
binomial logistic regression analysis with trait self-handicapping, depletion manipulation, and 
handicap viability as predictors of partner choice. Main effects were assessed in an initial block, 
2-way interactions were assessed in a secondary block, and 3-way interactions were assessed in a 
final block. 
 The primary block of the model was significant, χ²(3) = 19.175, p < .001. Depletion level 
was a significant predictor of partner choice (B = -.721, p = .021) such that depleted participants 
were 2.824 times more likely to pick the bad partner than non-depleted participants. Remember, 
though, that this manipulation was earlier found to have affected no perceptions of depletion – 
thus this result should be interpreted with caution. Trait self-handicapping was also a significant 
predictors of partner choice (B = 1.038, p <. 001) such that increases in handicapping scores 
increased the likelihood of choosing the bad partner. The partner instructions had no effect on 
partner choice. The second, χ²(3) = 1.244, p < .742 and third block of the model, χ²(1) = .793, p < 
.373, were both not significant. As such, no interactions were found. 
Discussion 
 In Study 3, I found some initial evidence that chronic handicappers were both more 
drawn to a bad partner who would distract them from their goal of doing well on an important 
task, and simultaneously less impressed by a good partner who would facilitate their goal. While 
replicating decades of self-handicapping studies and Study 1 by demonstrating self-handicapping 
41  
through doing negative things, this study provides the first evidence that handicappers might 
forgo proactive acts of self-control, specifically by not choosing to interact with people who help 
their goal pursuit. This result accords with other unpublished work from our lab finding that self-
handicappers structure their social networks in order to meet their self-protection goals (Milner, 
2007).  
Despite its allure, however, the motivation behind the forgoing of a good partner and the 
choosing of a bad partner is unclear in this study. Although I found trait handicapping was 
related to concerns over failing, this fear did not subsequently predict the evaluations of the 
partners, conflicting with previous research (Hirt et al, 2000). Similarly, in contrast to past 
research (e.g. Hendrix & Hirt, 2009), we found no effects of a handicap viability manipulation: 
participants handicapped both when the situation afforded a viable handicap, and when the 
situation removed that handicap as a viable explanation for poor performance. This suggests that 
handicappers might not be forming these impressions in a strategic manner to externalize future 
failure.  
One explanation for this effect is that participants did not notice or forgot the 
manipulation by the time they made their ratings at the end of the study. I chose not to include a 
manipulation check for these instructions as I believed it would cue participants too much to the 
hypotheses of the study. Since there were so many moving parts and the study took up to an 
hour, participants could have easily forgotten about the partner manipulation by the time they 
rated and chose their partner near the end of the study. The lack of a manipulation check does not 
allow us to assess this; however, previous self-handicapping studies are similar in length and find 
effects of this type of manipulation (e.g. Hendrix & Hirt, 2009), suggesting this might not be the 
case. This lack of an effect, however, leaves open to interpretation the reason behind 
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handicappers’ ratings of their partners. Since chronic handicappers are not only drawn to bad 
partners and avoiding good partners when told their partner choice matters, I cannot claim this 
choice is truly motivated by self-protection and strategically used to externalize failure.  
One potential alternative explanation for handicappers’ partner ratings is that, even if 
participants listened to and remembered the instructions, chronic handicappers are unable to 
distinguish between good partners and bad partners, while non-handicappers are able to make 
this distinction. Mean ratings of the targets lend some support to this: LSH rate good partners 
positively (M = 5.448) and bad partners negatively (M = 3.960), while HSH rate good (M = 
4.976) and bad partners (M = 4.258) similarly. Although this might reflect an inability to 
distinguish between a good and bad partner, it could also reflect handicappers’ motivated desire 
to work with a bad partner. After choosing their partner, we had participants write an open-ended 
explanation about why they chose the partner they did. Descriptively, when someone chose the 
good partner, they explained they picked that partner because he/she seemed to “take school 
serious(ly)”, “have their life together”, and “have their priorities right”. In contrast, when 
someone chose the bad partner, the potential partner appeared to “realize that life was not all 
about school”, “would be easier to work with”, and was “less uptight than the other person”. 
Perhaps these explanations differed by level of handicapping such that chronic handicappers 
were more likely to justify their motivated choice of a bad partner by explaining it in terms of 
interpersonal relatability or ease of working together. Doing so might mitigate the interpersonal 
costs of negative actions we often see in handicapping (Hirt et al., 2003; Eyink et al., in prep). 
However, this supposition needs to be directly tested in the current data set after additional 
coding is completed and explored more fully future work. In general, more research is needed to 
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explicate under what conditions handicappers avoid positive things, and if these inactions are 
driven by the same motivations as traditional handicapping actions. 
 Finally, although perhaps unsurprising given the current climate of depletion research, 
my manipulation of depletion was not successful in this study. Unfortunately, this left me unable 
to test some of my hypotheses as there were no systematic differences in depletion. Although 
there have been several high-profile replication failures of the depletion effect (e.g. Hagger et al., 
2016), this particular manipulation was chosen as it was recently found in an upcoming 
registered replication project to have affected perceptions of depletion (Vohs, 2018).  
In hindsight, I suspect even if the manipulation worked, we might not have seen an effect 
on our partner ratings due to the long length of time between the depletion manipulation and the 
dependent manipulations. This study took participants up to an hour, and there was upwards of 
20-30 minutes between the end of the depletion manipulation and the end of the partner ratings. 
Thus, even if the participant had felt depleted after the e-crossing task, this might have worn off 
by the time our dependent variable was measured, particularly if any positive experiences 
provided motivation to the participant. Perhaps future studies should use a stronger manipulation 
such as having participants come in during their peak or off-peak times of the day, as has been 
used successfully in past work (Eyink et al., 2017). Although more difficult to implement, this 
might provide a stronger and longer-lasting manipulation of cognitive depletion. 
General Discussion 
Overall, the set of studies described above examined situations in which self-protective 
goals might overwhelm an individuals’ pursuit of distal goals, causing them to strategically 
abstain from proactive self-control processes in order to shift attributions for failure to an 
external source.  
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These studies used multiple methodologies, samples, and domains, to demonstrate these 
effects. Studies 1 and 2 used online participants and imagined situations, while Study 3 used an 
in-lab paradigm and a task participants believed to be real. Studies 1 and 3 used student samples, 
while Study 2 used an older, adult sample. Study 1 explored self-handicapping in the domain of 
students’ studying habits and behaviors. Study 2 examined when individuals plan to exercise 
during their day. Study 3 explored the type of partner people choose to work with on a test of 
mental flexibility.  
In Study 1, I replicated a basic effect of actional self-handicapping (e.g. Berglas & Jones, 
1978) such that chronic self-handicappers were more likely than non-handicappers to engage in 
negative actions, specifically bad study habits, when they lacked good self-control abilities. I 
found no evidence that handicappers were less likely to engage in good habits than non-
handicappers, though.  
In Study 2, I found some evidence that when individuals with poor self-control fear 
failure, they are less likely to engage proactive self-control processes and put off a difficult task 
until later in the day. However, I found no evidence that this inaction was predicted by trait self-
handicapping – thus the motivation behind this abstention remained unclear.  
In Study 3, I again found that chronic self-handicappers were more likely to engage in a 
self-sabotaging behavior (as found in Study 1 and numerous previous handicapping studies); 
however, I also found initial evidence that chronic handicappers were more likely to forgo a 
helpful behavior by rating a good potential partner less positively. Contrary to past work (Hirt et 
al., 2000), this behavior did not seem to be motivated by fear of failure and did not only occur 
when the handicap was viable. Thus again, the motivation behind these actions remains muddled.  
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Taken together, these diverse set of studies provide limited evidence for the central thesis 
of this dissertation that self-handicapping can occur through inactions as well as actions. 
Self-Control over Self-Protection 
One consistent pattern amongst these studies is the finding that, contrary to my 
predictions, self-control tendencies seemed to win out over self-protection concerns. In Study 1, 
for example, although overall chronic handicapping predicted the use of bad habits, this was only 
true for chronic handicappers with low self-control. If a chronic handicapper had good self-
regulatory abilities, they were unlikely to use bad habits. Similarly, in Study 2, we found that 
concern over failure predicted the forgoing of a proactive strategy; but again, only for those who 
were low in self-control. If a person with good self-regulatory abilities feared failure, they were 
still likely to use the proactive strategy and exercise early in the day. Despite my predictions to 
the contrary, these results suggest that at least in the domains studied and with the paradigms 
used, self-control tendencies outweigh self-protection. This holds true even when fear of failure 
is high and self-protection concerns might be especially salient.  
This seems to suggest a re-evaluation of my conceptualization of how individuals balance 
having multiple active goals of self-protection and distal achievement. Despite previous research 
finding that achievement is often sacrificed to engage in self-handicapping to protect self-esteem 
(e.g. Berglas & Jones, 1978), it seems that individuals with good self-control can use proactive 
self-control processes to structure the situation to remove the need to react in such a protective, 
but damaging, manner. For example, in Study 3, I found that trait self-handicapping predicted the 
amount of fear an individual felt about failing at an important task (see also Hirt et al., 2000) 
such that chronic handicappers felt more fear than non-handicappers in the exact same situation. 
Despite these heightened concerns, this fear of failure did not predict partner evaluations. This 
46  
suggests that individuals, particularly those with good self-control as seen in Studies 1 and 2, 
might have structured their environment in a way so as to prevent themselves from reacting 
negatively to fear of failure in the moment. Just as those with good self-control are able to 
remove themselves from situations that tempt them with in-the-moment rewards, individuals 
might be able to avoid handicapping by structuring their environment to prevent themselves from 
engaging in self-sabotage, despite any in-the-moment panic and fear they might experience.   
This suggests that our effects might differ if we look at these individuals only when they 
are only engaging in reactive self-control, versus when they are able to engage in proactive self-
control. In situations where an individual is not able to prepare, they might indeed fail at in-the-
moment, reactive self-control when confronted with potential failure, and self-protection might 
win, causing them to engage in self-handicapping. However, in other situations where an 
individual is prepared (e.g. is able to structure their situation, create implementation intentions, 
etc.), we might see this same individual with the same amount of fear of failure, not handicap 
due to the proactive processes they engaged in. 
Future research should directly test these suppositions and examine boundary conditions. 
For example, if task importance or fear of failure is increased drastically, would individuals be 
more likely to engage in self-protection? It’s possible that proactive strategies might break down 
in these extremes; however, if the situation is well-structured through proactive processes, the 
individual might be able to avoid handicapping no matter the amount of panic and fear they 
experience, as this damaging self-protective option would be removed from their environment. 
All of this implies that one way to go about reducing self-handicapping behavior amongst 
populations of interests (i.e. students, athletes) is to bolster individuals’ self-control abilities, 
specifically their proactive self-control processes. As in the literature, most lay individuals 
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believe self-control involves only a reactive process. However, most successful self-regulators 
use proactive processes to remove the need to engage in that in-the-moment impulse control that 
so often fails (e.g. Trope & Fishbach, 2000; Fishbach et al., 2003). Descriptively, students in 
Study 1 were much less familiar with proactive self-control strategies (M = 2.658) than other 
types of positive behaviors (M = 5.256). By increasing awareness and use of these proactive 
studying strategies, students might react less negatively when confronted in the moment with 
potential failure, thus decreasing the use of handicapping and its downstream consequences 
(Zuckerman, Kieffer, & Knee, 1988; Zuckermen & Tsai, 2005). Obviously, this type of 
intervention awaits future research and direct testing before use. 
Ambiguity and Self-handicapping 
 Another interesting implication of these effects (or lack thereof), is that handicappers 
must have unambiguous excuses for failure. Although still present, the tie from forgoing 
proactive self-control to failure is less clear than between failure and engaging in negative 
behaviors. For example, one proactive study strategy is to turn off your Wi-Fi when studying to 
avoid the temptations of social media, YouTube, etc. However, if a handicapper forgoes this 
proactive strategy, the link between not turning off the internet and failing at studying is unclear. 
Did not turning the Wi-Fi off really lead directly to the failure? Or was it something else – like 
the clearly negative action of getting on YouTube? Participants seem unsure. 
 This ambiguity of inaction is consistent with findings of the feature positive effect (e.g. 
Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1979) which holds that both people and animals have difficulty processing 
non-occurrences to form attitudes and make judgments (e.g. Fazio, Sherman, & Herr, 1982). 
Thus, although nonactions should logically provide the same information as a non-action, 
research finds individuals struggle to comprehend the meaning of them, much in the same way 
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our handicapping participants seem to struggle to understand the attributional meaning of an 
inaction. Instead, handicappers seem to prefer a more direct and unambiguous strategy of clear, 
negative actions like listening to distracting music (Rhodewalt & Davison, 1984) or drinking 
(Kolditz & Arkin, 1982). In this way, the link between their behavior and the failure is 
unavoidable and the external attribution must be made.  
We see evidence for this supposition in the lack of a self-handicapping effect on good 
study habits in Study 1, and the lack of a self-handicapping effect on a proactive exercise 
strategy in Study 2. Further, in Study 1, we also see a lack of a self-handicapping effect on 
ambiguous study habits. For these ambiguous habits, the attribution between their use and failure 
might be even less clear than for inactions. These patterns imply that handicapping truly is a 
strategic, motivated process – if a behavior can’t be directly tied to failure, a handicapper won’t 
use it, no matter how motivated by failure concerns they are as the benefit of externalization will 
not be present. 
Of course, this supposition is called into question by the lack of a handicap viability 
effect in Study 3. We found all handicappers, regardless of whether they were told partner choice 
affected their performance or not, showed more positive evaluations of the bad partner and more 
negative impressions of the good partner. Without a manipulation check, it is unclear exactly 
what to make of this null effect. Perhaps participants didn’t remember the manipulation by the 
time they got to the partner ratings; or maybe participants remembered the manipulation, only to 
decide the handicap was viable for them regardless of the instructions (e.g. Hendrix & Hirt, 
2009). Without a direct test, though, the implication of this null effect remains unclear. 
Future lines of work can test these implications and mixed results by directly 
manipulating the attributional ambiguity of external justifications provided to handicappers. 
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Instead of just varying whether a handicap is viable or not, adding a third condition where the 
attributions to failure are unclear or mixed could provide an interesting future test of these 
results. 
Private vs. Public Nature of Self-Handicapping 
 Since its inception, researchers in the field of self-handicapping have debated whether 
handicapping is motivated by the goal of protecting one’s self-esteem (Jones & Berglas, 1978) or 
the goal of managing others’ impressions of you (Kolditz & Arkin, 1982). Interestingly, 
handicappers’ preference for clear, negative actions might indicate that the interpersonal goals 
involved in self-handicapping take a back seat to self-protection. 
 Specifically, in previous work, targets who handicap are rated more negatively than non-
handicappers (Hirt et al., 2003; Eyink et al., in prep). We find that handicappers sometimes 
change their behaviors based on those interpersonal consequences (Eyink et al., in prep), and that 
different handicaps vary in the amount of interpersonal cost associated with them (Eyink, 
Boucher, & Hirt, in prep). The claims used in these previous studies are quite explicit – the target 
clearly withdraws effort before a test or claims illness before an interview. In the current studies, 
though, inactions less clearly and explicitly provide an attribution to failure. Although 
detrimental to self-protection, this lack of clarity could provide additional interpersonal benefits. 
For example, a student could forgo the proactive strategy of leaving his cellphone at home and 
justify this behavior as needing to set alarms to pace studying or by needing to look up terms on 
the internet. Because this type of handicapping is more ambiguous and easier to justify, the 
interpersonal costs associated with it might be lower. If an audience member is not able to 
directly tie the action to a motivated cover-up for failure, he or she might be less likely to 
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derogate the handicapper. Future research should directly assess if inactions versus actions do 
vary in the interpersonal costs associated with their use. 
 Despite this potential benefit of decreased interpersonal costs, it seems that handicappers 
still prefer the more costly, but direct and explicit actions researchers traditionally have studied 
in the literature. This implies that the impression management goals involved in self-
handicapping take a backseat to self-protection goals as individuals care more about the 
attributions individuals make about performance than being liked.  
Conclusion 
Although traditionally involving doing something negative, I investigated whether 
individuals motivated by self-protection concerns would also forgo doing something positive. 
Results show limited support for this prediction and seem to imply that self-handicappers prefer 
unambiguous actions that can be clearly tied to future failure. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Scatterplot of trait self-handicapping scores and trait self-control scores in Study 1. 
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Figure 2. Interaction of self-handicapping and self-control scores on the likelihood to engage in 
bad habits in Study 1. 
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of trait self-handicapping scores and trait self-control scores in Study 2. 
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Figure 4. Interaction of self-control and fear of health goal failure scores on the amount of time 
between waking up and exercising in Study 2. 
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Appendix 1: Study 1 Pilot Testing and Final Measures 
Below, I present the results of a pilot test used to create the composite measures for Study 
1 assessing “good habits”, “bad habits”, and “ambiguous habits”. 81 participants enrolled in 
several sections of social psychology at Indiana University – Bloomington completed this packet 
of questionnaires for partial fulfillment of extra credit. 
For each person, place, item, or behavior, participants rated how helpful or distracting 
they found the habit to be for their studying. The average ratings are presented below along with 
the final categorization of each scale item as either good, bad, or ambiguous. Good items are 
those that were rated as helpful, but not distracting; bad items are those that are distracting, but 
not helpful; ambiguous items are those that are both distracting and helpful. 
 
 Helpful (SD) Distracting (SD) Final Categorization 
People    
No one 5.160 (1.545) 2.407 (1.701) GOOD 
People not in my class or who have not 
previously taken the class (e.g. friends, 
significant others, roommates, family 
members, coworkers, etc.) 
3.148 (1.493) 5.074 (1.243) BAD 
People in my class or who have previously 
taken the class 5.506 (1.226) 3.469 (1.295) AMB 
Places    
Communal study area (at library, dorm, IMU, 
etc.) 4.704 (1.706) 4.198 (1.512) AMB 
Private study area (at library, dorm, IMU, 
etc.) 5.975 (1.012) 2.432 (1.303) GOOD 
Living area (of dorm, apartment, house, 
sorority house, fraternity house, etc.) 3.988 (1.728) 4.654 (1.621) AMB 
In bed 2.914 (1.567) 5.062 (1.528) BAD 
Friends’, significant others’, or family 
members’ house, apartment, dorm, etc. 3.420 (1.303) 5.247 (1.124) AMB 
65  
Coffee shop or restaurant 4.012 (1.867) 4.383 (1.463) AMB 
Park, Outside 3.926 (1.618) 4.123 (1.400) AMB 
Classroom, computer lab, etc. of campus 
academic building 4.914 (1.286) 2.852 (1.205) GOOD 
Items    
Cellphone 2.988 (1.410) 6.074 (1.034) BAD 
Laptop 5.556 (1.215) 4.407 (1.531) AMB 
Snacks or drinks (e.g. water, coffee, energy 
drinks, soda, etc.) 4.975 (1.516) 3.556 (1.517) AMB 
Alcohol or drugs 1.296 (1.006) 5.864 (2.167) BAD 
Writing implements (including notebooks, 
paper, pencils, pens, highlighters, sticky 
notes, etc.) 
6.222 (0.935) 1.630 (0.901) GOOD 
Textbook 5.877 (1.208) 1.395 (0.904) GOOD 
Lecture slides, notes, and study guides 6.679 (0.629) 1.383 (0.845) GOOD 
Behaviors    
Texting calling, or talking about topics 
unrelated to the course 1.358 (0.713) 6.469 (1.062) BAD 
Texting calling, or talking about topics related 
to the course 4.556 (1.332) 4.025 (1.775) AMB 
People watching, daydreaming 1.444 (0.866) 6.000 (1.235) BAD 
Using social media 1.173 (0.469) 6.568 (0.821) BAD 
Using email 3.025 (1.557) 4.630 (1.721) AMB 
Checking Canvas 4.716 (1.527) 3.556 (1.636) AMB 
Browsing the internet, internet shopping 1.309 (0.875) 6.173 (1.412) BAD 
Listening to music 4.160 (1.927) 3.938 (1.784) AMB 
Watching TVs/movies, or listening to podcast 1.840 (1.279) 5.642 (1.607) BAD 
Watching YouTube clips 2.086 (1.559) 5.531 (1.740) BAD 
Watching tutorials about course content (e.g. 
Khan Academy, Crash Course, etc.) 5.148 (1.467) 2.284 (1.098) GOOD 
Organizing class materials or backpack 4.556 (1.754) 3.222 (1.492) AMB 
Playing a game on cellphone or computer 1.222 (0.689) 6.358 (1.316) BAD 
Reviewing textbook (including reading, 
summarizing, highlighting, etc.) 5.741 (1.311) 1.827 (1.192) GOOD 
Making flashcards, using Quizlet, or testing 
recall 6.148 (1.085) 1.704 (1.198) GOOD 
66  
Reviewing or rewriting class notes, 
rewatching lectures 6.395 (0.801) 1.593 (1.202) GOOD 
Making study guides, outlines, or review 
sheets 6.469 (0.760) 1.568 (1.234) GOOD 
Working on other assignments 3.222 (1.565) 4.247 (1.670) AMB 
Taking a practice test, completing practice 
problems 6.235 (1.003) 1.605 (1.033) GOOD 
Attending a review session 6.222 (1.107) 1.863 (1.403) GOOD 
Taking a nap 3.160 (1.616) 4.815 (1.711) AMB 
Not studying, choosing to do other activities 1.370 (0.968) 6.259 (1.340) BAD 
Proactive Behaviors    
Restricting use of distracting websites (e.g. 
using apps like StayFocused, Hey Focus, 
Mindful Browsing) 
5.049 (1.897) 2.235 (1.675) GOOD 
Restricting social media use (e.g. turning off 
social media notifications, deleting social 
media apps, deactivating social media 
accounts, posting on social media you won’t 
be using your account for a while) 
5.778 (1.612) 2.123 (1.623) GOOD 
Making a commitment in person or on social 
media to study 4.395 (1.954) 2.395 (1.602) GOOD 
Restricting internet use (e.g. turn off Wi-Fi, 
turn off data, enter airplane mode) 4.852 (2.044) 2.519 (1.817) GOOD 
Restricting cellphone use (e.g. silencing 
phone, turning off phone, enabling do not 
disturb, leaving phone in backpack or at 
home, using an app like Pocket Points) 
5.926 (1.403) 2.235 (1.583) GOOD 
Using a study technique involving working 
for a set amount of time and then taking a 
break 
5.802 (1.418) 2.247 (1.593) GOOD 
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Finally, below are ratings for how each of the final composite measures hung together for ratings 
of helpfulness and distraction. All three composites had acceptable reliability. 
GOOD_helpful α = .788 BAD_helpful α = .687 AMB_helpful α = .708 
GOOD_distracting α = 
.883 BAD_distracting α = .699 AMB_distracting α = .682 
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Appendix 2: Study 2 Materials 
Health Fear of Failure 
Please respond to each of the following statements. Each statement is asking about how you 
currently feel at this moment. Please respond with the appropriate number. If you think the 
statement captures very well what you are currently feeling, indicate “7” for very much. If the 
statement does not capture at all what you are currently feeling, indicate a “1” for not at all. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Very much 
 
1. I have doubts about my ability to maintain a healthy diet and exercise program. 
2. I am confident that I can maintain a healthy diet and exercise program.* 
3. I am uncertain about how well I can maintain a healthy diet and exercise program. 
4. I am not setting my expectations too high for maintaining a healthy diet and exercise 
program. 
5. I expect I will poorly maintain a healthy diet and exercise program. 
 
Health Importance and Difficulty (Items 7 and 8) 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the statements that follow using the 
provided scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly 
agree      
Strongly 
disagree 
 
1. Doing well in school and studying for my classes is very important to me 
2. I find it very unpleasant/difficult to do well in school and study for my classes 
3. Maintaining social relationships is very important to me 
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4. I find it very unpleasant/difficult to maintain social relationships 
5. Keeping my clothes clean and organized is very important to me 
6. I find it very unpleasant/difficult to keep my clothes clean and organized 
7. Exercising and being healthy is very important to me 
8. I find it very unpleasant/difficult to exercise and be healthy 
9. Finding a job or internship is very important to me 
10. I find it very unpleasant/difficult to find a job or internship 
 
Agenda and Instructions 
Imagine that you are planning a Saturday using the schedule printed below. 
5am  
6am  
7am  
8am  
10am  
11am  
12pm  
1pm  
2pm  
3pm  
4pm  
5pm  
6pm  
7pm  
8pm  
9pm  
10pm  
11pm  
12am  
1am  
2am  
3am  
4am  
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You have several tasks that you must complete. These tasks are listed below on the left. 
Assuming that each task will take one hour to complete, create a schedule by specifying the time 
you plan to complete each task. 
If there are other activities that you might do (e.g. hang out with friends, get lunch, take nap, run 
errands), specify the activity in one of the blanks on the left and then indicate at what time you 
plan to complete the task. 
Finally, specify times for when you might realistically wake up and stop for the day, whether that 
means going to sleep or stopping your work and beginning evening leisure activities. 
Remember that because each task takes one hour, you must only select one activity per hour 
− Exercise 
− Make an unpleasant phone call (e.g., to a relative who talks too much, to someone to 
whom you need to give bad news) 
− Laundry 
− Apply for a new job 
− Other ____________________ 
− Other ____________________ 
− Other ____________________ 
− Other ____________________ 
− Other ____________________ 
− Other ____________________ 
− Other ____________________ 
− Other ____________________ 
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− Other ____________________ 
− Other ____________________ 
(For each activity, participants selected a time ranging from 5am to 4am on a drop-down menu). 
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Appendix 3: Study 3 Materials 
Motivation 
In the next part of the experiment, you will be asked to complete another cognitive task that 
measures mental flexibility. Please answer the following questions with regard to the task you 
will be completing next. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Very  
 
1. How motivated are you to exert all of your effort on the mental flexibility task? 
2. How hard will you try on the mental flexibility task? 
3. How motivated are you to work hard on the mental flexibility task? 
 
Perceived Depletion (1-3) and Mental Fatigue (4-7) 
The following items ask about your CURRENT state of mental tiredness. Please answer the 
following questions as best as you can about how you CURRENTLY feel. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Very  
 
1. How mentally exhausted do you now feel? 
2. How tired do you now feel? 
3. How well can you concentrate? 
4. When I am doing something right now, I can keep my thoughts on it. 
5. I can concentrate well right now. 
6. It takes a lot of effort to concentrate on things right now. 
7. My thoughts easily wander right now. 
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Evaluative Concern (scoring based off of Eyink et al., 2017) 
Please respond to each of the statements on the following pages.  Each statement is asking about 
how you currently feel at this moment in regards to the upcoming mental flexibility task.  Please 
respond with the appropriate number.  If you think the statement captures very well what you are 
currently feeling, indicate "7" for very much.  If the statement does not capture at all what you 
are currently feeling, indicate a "1" for not at all. 
When you are ready to begin, click < continue > below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all      Very much 
 
1. It will bother me if I don’t do as well as others expect me to. 
2. I will be disappointed with myself if I perform poorly. 
3. I am not worried about what others think of my performance. 
4. I have doubts about my ability to perform well on this task. 
5. I will feel I have let others down if I don’t do my best. 
6. I am confident that I will perform well. 
7. I have set a high standard for my performance on this task. 
8. It is important to me that I do well on this task. 
9. I am uncertain about how well I will do. 
10. I would be proud if I did well on this task. 
11. I am not setting my expectations too high for my performance on this task. 
12. I want to do as well as I possibly can. 
13. I expect to do poorly on this task. 
14. I am concerned about how others might regard my performance. 
15. I won’t be satisfied unless I get a high score.
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